Causal Loops and Collapse in the Transactional Interpretation of Quantum
  Mechanics by Marchildon, Louis
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
03
01
8v
2 
 6
 S
ep
 2
00
6
Causal Loops and Collapse in the
Transactional Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics
Louis Marchildon
De´partement de physique, Universite´ du Que´bec,
Trois-Rivie`res, Qc. Canada G9A 5H7
email: marchild a©uqtr.ca
Abstract
Cramer’s transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics is re-
viewed, and a number of issues related to advanced interactions and
state vector collapse are analyzed. Where some have suggested that
Cramer’s predictions may not be correct or definite, I argue that they
are, but I point out that the classical-quantum distinction problem
in the Copenhagen interpretation has its parallel in the transactional
interpretation.
Re´sume´
L’interpre´tation transactionnelle de la me´canique quantique, pro-
pose´e par J. G. Cramer, est sommairement revue, et quelques ques-
tions lie´es aux interactions avance´es et a` l’effondrement du vecteur
d’e´tat sont analyse´es. Certains ont sugge´re´ que les pre´dictions de
l’interpre´tation de Cramer ne sont pas correctes ou ne sont pas bien
de´finies. Je cherche a` montrer qu’au contraire elles le sont, mais je
signale que le proble`me de la distinction du classique et du quan-
tique, inhe´rent a` l’interpre´tation de Copenhague, a son paralle`le dans
l’interpre´tation transactionnelle.
KEY WORDS: quantum mechanics; transactional interpretation; causal
loops; advanced interactions; collapse.
1
1 Introduction
State vector collapse is one of the great foundational problems of quantum
mechanics. It was postulated by von Neumann in his theory of measure-
ment [1], as a process wherein the Schro¨dinger equation ceases to be valid.
Although von Neumann kept his discussion to a general framework, specific
models of collapse were proposed later on, the best known being the sponta-
neous localization theories [2].
In contradistinction with von Neumann, most approaches to the quan-
tum measurement problem have tried to retain the universal validity of the
Schro¨dinger equation (or of a suitable relativistic generalization). Decoher-
ence theory, in this context, goes a long way towards identifying the physical
variables relevant to an effective collapsed state [3]. Yet many believe that
decoherence by itself does not solve the measurement problem [4]. Nor [5]
does the epistemic view of quantum states [6, 7], according to which the
state vector represents knowledge, or information, rather than the state of a
physical system. One way to obtain the effect of collapse without modify-
ing the Schro¨dinger equation consists in introducing additional structure to
the Hilbert space formalism. Bohmian mechanics [8] and modal interpreta-
tions [9] implement such a program.
Cramer’s transactional interpretation [10, 11, 12, 13, 14], which has re-
ceived comparatively little attention, is another attempt to understand the
effect of collapse while keeping as close as possible to the framework of the
Schro¨dinger (or some appropriate relativistic) equation. In Cramer’s ap-
proach, a quantum measurement or, more generally, a quantum process in-
volving the transfer of conserved quantities should not be viewed as involving
the collapse of the state vector at a specific time, but rather as a transaction
involving many potential outcomes and, most importantly, the exchange of
both retarded and advanced waves. Cramer argues that such an outlook
helps in making sense of many otherwise paradoxical features of quantum
mechanics.
In this paper I will first give an overview of the transactional interpre-
tation, and then proceed to analyze a number of issues raised in its wake.
Any theory that introduces advanced as well as retarded interactions raises
the specter of causal loops. In Cramer’s approach advanced waves do not
allow an observer to change its own past, but some investigators have argued
that they entail indefinite or incorrect predictions. I will review these ar-
guments, and propose a way to understand the transactional interpretation
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that saves its full predictive power. As a by-product of the analysis, some
consequences of the atemporal view of a transaction will be brought to light.
In the end I will argue that the problem of the classical-quantum distinction
in the Copenhagen interpretation corresponds, in Cramer’s interpretation, to
the one of making precise the notion of a transaction.
2 The transactional interpretation
Cramer’s transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics is inspired by
the electromagnetic theory of Wheeler and Feynman [15, 16]. In this time-
symmetric theory, advanced solutions of Maxwell’s equations are just as im-
portant as retarded ones. The electromagnetic field acting on a charged
particle comes from the other charged particles only, and is equal to half the
sum of the retarded and advanced Lie´nard-Wiechert solutions of Maxwell’s
equations. Wheeler and Feynman succeeded in recovering the usual electro-
magnetic results, including the expression for radiation reaction, by postulat-
ing in addition that the universe is a perfect absorber of all the electromag-
netic radiation coming from inside it. In the Wheeler-Feynman approach,
an accelerated charge does not radiate if there are no absorbers, and the
experimentally confirmed radiation formula is recovered if there is complete
absorption. Cramer, in the spirit of Wheeler and Feynman, attributes physi-
cal reality both to a given solution of the Schro¨dinger equation (propagating
forward in time) and to its complex conjugate (propagating backward in
time).
An example of a quantum-mechanical interaction is the emission of a
microscopic particle (say an electron) at some time t0, followed by its ab-
sorption at a later time t1. Originating at t0, the usual solution ψ of the
Schro¨dinger equation propagates through t > t0, and is called by Cramer
an offer wave. Also associated with t0 is the complex conjugate ψ
∗, which
propagates through t < t0. The solution ψ reaches all potential detectors,
its amplitude ψ(ri, ti) at detector i being given by the Schro¨dinger equation.
Each detector in turn emits both retarded and advanced (or confirmation)
waves. Cramer argues that the confirmation wave coming from detector i
reaches the source with an amplitude proportional to
|ψ(ri, ti)|2 = ψ(ri, ti)ψ∗(ri, ti), (1)
where the first factor on the right-hand side coincides with the amplitude
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of the stimulating offer wave at i, and the second one comes from the fact
that the confirmation wave develops as the time reverse of the offer wave.
Advanced waves reaching the source in turn stimulate a new cycle of offer
and confirmation waves, and so on. For t < t0, under appropriate bound-
ary conditions, the waves coming from all the potential absorbers cancel the
advanced wave coming from the emitter. Eventually, a transaction is es-
tablished between the emitter and one of the detectors, and the process is
complete. If the probability that the transaction be established with detec-
tor i is taken to be proportional to the amplitude (1) of the confirmation
wave coming from that detector, Born’s quantum-mechanical probabilistic
rule follows. (See Sec. 6 for a more complete analysis of this assertion.)
To illustrate how a transaction works, let us consider one of the examples
analyzed by Cramer, a variant of the negative-result experiment of Ren-
ninger [17] (Fig. 1). A source S sits at the center of a spherical shell E2 of
radius R2. On the interior of the shell are perfect absorbers that will detect
any particle leaving S and reaching E2. Inside E2 is a portion E1 of a con-
centric shell of radius R1, whose interior is also lined with perfect detectors.
The solid angle subtended at S by E1 is equal to Ω1, whereas the solid angle
subtended by the portion of E2 visible from S is equal to Ω2 = 4pi − Ω1.
S
E
2
E
1
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Figure 1: A negative-result experiment.
The system is set up so that at time t0, the source emits exactly one
particle with speed approximately equal to v and with a wave function in-
dependent of angles. For t0 < t < t1 = t0 + R1/v, the state vector can be
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represented as
|ψ〉 = c1|E1〉+ c2|E2〉, (2)
where each vector |Ei〉 is associated with detection at the corresponding shell
Ei, and where |ci|2 = Ωi/4pi.
Now suppose that at some time t > t1, no detector at E1 has fired.
In most interpretations of quantum mechanics, the particle’s state vector is
thereafter taken to be equal to |E2〉. This is certainly good enough for the
purpose of predicting results of subsequent experiments. Thus it seems that
the null result at t1 has produced the collapse of the state vector (2) into |E2〉.
Different views of the process of collapse may have more or less problems in
explaining how such a mechanism can be triggered by what appears to be
the absence of a physical interaction.
In Cramer’s interpretation, there is no such thing as a collapse occur-
ring at a specific time t1 or t2 = t0 + R2/v. The collapse is interpreted as
the completion of the transaction. The whole process is viewed atemporally
in four-dimensional space-time, along the full interval between emission and
absorption. The condition that only one particle is emitted at the source
translates into the fact that only one transaction is established in the end,
either between S and E1 (with probability Ω1/4pi proportional to the ampli-
tude of the confirmation wave received at S from E1) or between S and E2
(with corresponding probability Ω2/4pi).
3 Maudlin’s challenge
It is well known that in many circumstances, advanced interactions can lead
to causal paradoxes. Such problems may be compounded in stochastic the-
ories, where the present doesn’t uniquely determine the future. In quantum
mechanics for instance, the state vector at t0 may specify probabilities of
measurement results at t1, and various measurement outcomes may lead to
different macroscopic configurations at t2. Hence the configuration of ab-
sorbers at t2 is not determined by the state vector at t0. Maudlin [18] has
argued that the stochasticity of the sources of advanced waves inherent in
Cramer’s theory renders his approach inconsistent.
Maudlin considers the situation depicted in Fig. 2. A source S can emit,
at a prescribed time t0, a particle of approximate speed v. The particle goes
either to the left or to the right, with equal probability. To the right of the
source is a detector A at a distance R1, and a detector B at a larger distance
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R2. The experiment is set up so that if A has not detected a particle soon
after t1 = t0+R1/v, detector B is quickly moved to a distance R2 to the left of
the source, in time to detect the incoming particle at t2 = t0 + R2/v. (Note
that a practical realization of Maudlin’s experiment would require careful
monitoring of the particle’s emission time and speed, as well as velocity
spread about the two back-to-back directions. All of this can be implemented
within the constraints of the uncertainty principle.)

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Figure 2: Detector B quickly moves to the left if and only if detector A does
not fire.
Maudlin claims that Cramer’s interpretation cannot deal with this situa-
tion. For the retarded wave emitted by the source has the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|L〉+ |R〉), (3)
where |L〉 and |R〉 represent states of the particle going to the left or to the
right. Detector A, fixed on the right-hand side, always receives the retarded
wave of amplitude 1/
√
2, and always sends a confirmation wave of amplitude
proportional to (1/
√
2)(1/
√
2)∗ = 1/2, so that Cramer’s theory correctly
predicts that it will absorb the particle with probability 1/2. But detector
B receives an offer wave and sends a confirmation wave only when it swings
to the left. The confirmation wave again has amplitude proportional to 1/2.
Cramer’s theory therefore predicts, according to Maudlin, that B should
absorb the particle half the times the offer wave reaches it. But in fact
it absorbs it every time the offer wave reaches it. Maudlin concludes that
Cramer’s theory collapses.
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4 Berkovitz’ and Kastner’s answers
Maudlin’s challenge was answered in two different ways by Berkowitz [19]
and Kastner [20]. Both of them make use of the distinction, introduced by
Butterfield [21], between big-space and many-spaces probabilities.
Without going into all details, one can say that the distinction is relevant
in situations where an experiment can be carried out using different setups,
or initial conditions. Take for instance the negative-result experiment intro-
duced in Sec. 2. Suppose the experimenter decides to run it in two different
ways, either as described in Sec. 2, or without the larger shell E2. In each run
the choice of setup can be made by the experimenter’s direct intervention,
or through some automated device picking the setup either deterministically
or randomly.
In this context, big-space probabilities are defined by considering the
experimental setup Σ, as well as the system’s initial state Λ if it is allowed
to change over runs, as random variables just like the measurement outcome
X . A general probability function P (Σ,Λ, X) is therefore introduced. The
specific probability function of outcomes for a given setup Σi and a given
initial state Λk is then viewed as a conditional probability, that is,
P (X|Σi,Λk) = P (Σi,Λk, X)
P (Σi,Λk)
, (4)
where
P (Σi,Λk) =
∑
{X}
P (Σi,Λk, X). (5)
Many-spaces probabilities, in contrast, do not consider the setup and initial
state as random variables, and do not assign them probabilities. Independent
probability spaces are defined for each value of the setup and initial state,
the outcome being the only random variable. The independent probability
functions are denoted as PΣi,Λk(X).
In answering Maudlin’s challenge, Berkovitz first points out that Cramer’s
offer waves and confirmation waves should better be viewed as forward and
backward causal connections. He then argues that the confirmation waves
are different in the two cases where detector B in Fig. 2 is or is not swung to
the left. For if B is swung, the source receives confirmation waves from both
A and B, whereas if B is not swung, the source receives a confirmation wave
from A only. The backward causes being different, so should the source’s
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initial states be. One can accordingly use |ψ〉 to denote the source’s initial
state in cases where B is swung to the left, and |ψ′〉 in cases where B is not
swung.
Following Butterfield, Berkovitz then argues for the priority of many-
spaces probabilities over big-space probabilities, on the grounds that there
is little justification for assigning probabilities to states and setups. He then
notes that in situations where causal loops are present, one should not expect
the many-spaces probabilities (which are properties of the setup and state
specification) to coincide with the long-term relative frequencies. This, he
claims, answers Maudlin’s challenge, for in the causal loop where B is swung
to the left, the long-term relative frequency of detection (equal to 1) should
not be expected to coincide with the many-spaces probability of detection in
the initial state |ψ〉 (equal to 1/2). There is a price to pay for this, however.
Since one cannot assign probabilities to |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉, Cramer’s theory can
no longer be used to calculate the unconditional relative frequencies of left
and right detection.
It is true that, in general, backward causal connections can have the effect
described by Berkovitz. But here the question is whether in Cramer’s theory
they do or do not have that effect. I will argue that they most likely do not.
The reason is that if we follow Berkovitz’ argument, Cramer’s theory will
loose predictive power in contexts much wider than the one introduced by
Maudlin. Consider for instance the following two experimental setups: (i)
there is only a detector A in Fig. 2; (ii) there is a detector A to the right and
a detector B to the left in Fig. 2, both fixed in their respective positions. In
both cases, the source receives a confirmation wave from A, while it receives
a confirmation wave from B only in case (ii). If different confirmation waves
mean different causal connections in the strong sense suggested by Berkovitz,
then Cramer’s theory could not be used to predict that A would fire with the
same frequency in cases (i) and (ii). Indeed it could not compare any setups
where the configuration of any detector would change. This, I submit, entails
either that the causal connections carried by the confirmation wave should
not be as strong as envisaged by Berkovitz, or that if they are, they should
be the same irrespective of B’s position. Support for the latter possibility
will be offered in the next section.
In her response to Maudlin’s challenge, Kastner argues that Cramer’s
theory will keep its predictive power intact if it uses big-space instead of
many-spaces probabilities. This, she claims, implies that Cramer’s account
of transactions occurring in pseudotime, an account arguably not essential
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to his theory, cannot be maintained.
Kastner first points out that a simple inspection of Maudlin’s setup
(Fig. 2) already renders the pseudotime account suspect. Indeed the echo-
ing process between emitter and absorbers, which is supposed to determine
the absorption probabilities, presumably requires a fixed configuration of ab-
sorbers, which is not the case in Fig. 2. An echo between source S and
absorber B occurs if and only if no detection has been registered at A.
In Cramer’s approach, when the source in Fig. 2 emits the offer wave (3),
it also emits the advanced wave
〈ψ| = 1√
2
(〈L|+ 〈R|), (6)
propagating backward in time. If the particle is not absorbed by A and,
consequently, B swings to the left, the confirmation waves sent by A and B
cancel the source’s advanced wave at all times t < t0. But if the particle
is absorbed by A, no confirmation wave is sent by B. In this case, Kastner
argues, nothing will cancel the 〈L| part of the advanced wave emitted by
the source. The upshot is that the total wave configuration at times t < t0
is different depending on whether the particle is or is not absorbed by A.
Therefore the emission event, although it opens up different possible futures,
cannot be considered as a branch point before which the past is fixed.
Kastner then points out that what is common to the two cases where
B does or does not swing is the overlap between the offer and confirmation
waves between the source and A. This, now taken as a suitable branch point,
allows the partitioning of a big probability space into a subspace where the
transaction is indeed completed between the source and A, and a subspace
where it is completed between the source and B. Both are associated with
probabilities of 1/2. Since the partition is based on the connection between
the source and A, it does not depend in any way on an eventual echoing
between S and B. The pseudotime account of the transaction, therefore,
cannot be maintained.
5 A different solution
Berkovitz and Kastner proposed two different ways to meet Maudlin’s chal-
lenge. I will offer a third one which, I believe, is much in the spirit of the
Wheeler-Feynman theory of advanced actions.
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Let us first consider the experimental setup depicted in Fig. 3, which is
slightly different than Maudlin’s. In fact the only difference between Fig. 2
and Fig. 3 is that a detector C has been added to the left, farther from the
source than detector B. In most interpretations of quantum mechanics, the
presence or absence of detector C is completely immaterial, as no particle
ever reaches it. Indeed in all cases where a particle emitted by the source
is not absorbed by A, detector B swings to the left and absorbs it. The
particle therefore never reaches C, and its Schro¨dinger wave function in no
way depends on the presence or absence of that additional detector.
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Figure 3: Detector C will never fire.
In Cramer’s interpretation, however, the presence of C is relevant. For
in cases where the particle is absorbed by A and B does not swing, a con-
firmation wave is sent by C back to the source. In all cases, therefore, offer
waves are sent both to the right and to the left, and confirmation waves are
received both from the right and from the left, with amplitudes proportional
to (1/
√
2)2. As expected, the probability of absorption on the left side is
proportional to the amplitude of the corresponding confirmation wave.
Now how does this argument deal with the problem in Maudlin’s own situ-
ation, where no detector sits at C? It does so by making a suitable hypothesis
on the long-distance boundary conditions. The simplest such hypothesis is
the one made in the original approach of Wheeler and Feynman, who postu-
lated that the universe is a perfect absorber of all radiation emitted within
it. Under this assumption, no matter that B does or does not swing, the
offer wave emitted by the source to the left will sooner or later reach an
absorber, which will send a confirmation wave arriving at the source at t0
exactly. Just like the 〈R| component in Eq. (6), the 〈L| component of the
advanced wave emitted by the source will then always be cancelled by a con-
firmation wave for all t < t0. The probabilities of absorption at the left and
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at the right will both be proportional to the amplitude of the corresponding
confirmation waves, that is, to 1/2.
Thus the Wheeler-Feynman hypothesis of perfect absorption can fulfill
the function of detector C in Fig. 3. One should point out, however, that
it is not the only assumption that will do so. This is so much the better,
since the hypothesis has never achieved consensus. Particles with very low
interaction rates, like neutrinos, may never find a suitable absorber. But
Cramer has shown [11] that an assumption on the Big Bang singularity can
have the same effect on these particles as universal absorption. The idea is
that any advanced wave reaching the t = 0 singularity backward from t > 0 is
assumed to be reflected forward with a phase difference of 180◦. The upshot
is that the advanced wave sent by an emitter at t = t0 is cancelled for t < t0
by the reflected advanced wave, which for t > t0 reinforces the retarded
wave sent by the emitter. To an observer who in the end reinterprets all
advanced waves moving backward in time as retarded waves moving forward
in time with opposite momentum, reflection from the Big Bang singularity
is equivalent to perfect absorption.
To sum up, with either the hypothesis of perfect absorption a` la Wheeler
and Feynman, or Cramer’s assumption about the Big Bang singularity, one
can conclude that Fig. 3 correctly describes the complete setup of Maudlin’s
experiment.
6 Pseudotime and collapse
In their answers to Maudlin’s challenge, Berkovitz and Kastner relied on two
different interpretations of probabilities: Berkovitz used the many-spaces ap-
proach, whereas Kastner worked with the big space. In the solution proposed
here, by contrast, the distinction is not particularly critical. The setup and
initial state can be construed as adequately specified by the experimental
protocol in place at t0 (which determines the quantum-mechanical initial
wave function). Since the offer and confirmation waves in place at t0 do not
depend on whether or not B will swing to the left, the distinction introduced
by Berkovitz between initial states |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 is not relevant. Should the
experiment be run with different setups or initial wave functions, a many-
spaces or a big-space approach could both be put forward.
The solution proposed here also helps to clarify the meaning of the pseu-
dotime account of transactions. On the assumption that the universe is a
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perfect absorber (or that advanced waves are reflected at the Big Bang),
Cramer’s theory correctly predicts that in the setup of Fig. 2, absorption
occurs on the left in 50% of the runs. Yet it so happens that the transaction
is completed with the left absorber if and only if detector B has swung to the
left. Although the confirmation wave coming from the left originates from
a remote absorber just as often as it originates from B, the transaction is
never completed with the remote absorber. It is as if the confirmation wave
“knew” that it cannot effect a transaction in cases where it is emitted by the
remote absorber.
This can be taken as paradoxical, but I suggest it is viewed more aptly
as specifying better the significance of a transaction. The whole process is
laid out in four-dimensional space-time. The future, though not predictable,
is well defined. The offer and confirmation waves must adapt to the require-
ment that the four-dimensional process be consistent with the boundary con-
ditions. In the present case, these conditions are that B absorbs the particle
if and only if A does not absorb it. The forward and backward causal connec-
tions must be strong enough to satisfy the boundary conditions, but not so
strong as to allow information transfer or macroscopic communication. That
tension reflects the delicate locality balance inherent in the quantum world,
as well as the transactional interpretation’s objective to avoid the notion of
collapse at a specific time.
In a general transaction, offer and confirmation waves are exchanged be-
tween the emitter and all possible absorbers. It is constitutive of the trans-
actional interpretation that a confirmation wave sent back from absorber i at
the space-time point (ri, ti) arrives at the emitter with an amplitude propor-
tional to |ψ(ri, ti)|2. This appears to reproduce Born’s rule with no further
ado. But in fact the matter is more subtle.
It is well known that if ψ(r, t) is a solution of the one-particle Schro¨dinger
equation, the integral
Ptot =
∫
|ψ(r, t)|2 dr, (7)
carried over all three-dimensional space, does not depend on time. The
identification of |ψ(r, t)|2 with the particle’s position probability density at
time t then implies that the total probability is conserved, as it should. In
Cramer’s approach, however, we are instructed to associate the probability
of a transaction with |ψ(ri, ti)|2. It turns out that in general, an integral
similar to the one on the right-hand side of Eq. (7), but with the integrand
evaluated at different times, will not represent a conserved probability. Does
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this mean that probabilities are not conserved in Cramer’s approach? The
answer is no, for the following reason.
Suppose that among all detectors susceptible to send a confirmation wave
back to the source, detector 1 receives the offer wave first. Owing to the
particle-detector interaction Hamiltonian, the particle and detector wave
functions thereafter become entangled, in a process that can be schematized
as
ψ(r, t)Φ
(r)
D → c1ψ1(r, t)Φ(a)D + c2ψ2(r, t)Φ(r)D . (8)
Here Φ
(r)
D and Φ
(a)
D represent ready and activated states of the detector. The
normalized wave function ψ1(r, t) evolves from the part of ψ(r, t) that inter-
acts with the detector, while the normalized ψ2(r, t) evolves from the part
that doesn’t. The coefficients c1 and c2 satisfy |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1. A process
like (8) occurs for each further interaction with each available detector. In
the end probability is conserved, not because a conserved integral similar
to (7) can be written down with an integrand defined at different times, but
because the particle’s reduced density matrix always has unit trace.
This takes care of the probability question, but it raises another issue.
As the particle outgoing from the source interacts with various objects, its
wave function becomes entangled. Clearly, such entanglement is a neces-
sary condition for a confirmation wave to be sent back to the source, and a
transaction to be eventually completed. But it is by no means a sufficient
condition. Any entanglement process that is easily reversible (i. e. one be-
tween the outgoing particle and another microscopic object) ought not to
give rise to a confirmation wave. For if it did lead to a transaction, the
latter would be reversible, which is impossible. A transaction represents a
completed quantum-mechanical process.
The question now is: What distinguishes a reversible entanglement pro-
cess, which gives rise to no confirmation wave and no transaction, from an
irreversible one, which does give rise to a confirmation wave and, possibly, to
a transaction. Of course, this question has no answer within the strict Hilbert
space formalism of quantum mechanics, where all entanglement is in prin-
ciple reversible. The upshot is that a transaction finds no room within the
limits of that formalism. Just like the notion of a classical apparatus in the
Copenhagen interpretation, or the one of wave function collapse in von Neu-
mann’s theory of measurement, the notion of a transaction must be added to
the minimal quantum-mechanical formalism. In particular, the transactional
interpretation cannot be considered complete unless the conditions for the
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possible occurrence of a transaction are spelled out in detail.
I should note that in contrasting collapse interpretations with his own,
Cramer pointed out that collapse models “beg the question of borders: Where
precisely is the border between macrophysics and microphysics and the bor-
der at which irreversibility begins?” [12, p. 683] He seemed to imply that
this problem does not show up in the transactional interpretation. But else-
where he acknowledged that “[the transactional interpretation’s] nonlocal
collapse mechanism is strictly at the interpretational level. It cannot supply
mechanisms missing from the formalism.” [13, p. 235] See also Ref. [22] for
additional remarks on the Copenhagen and transactional interpretations.
7 Conclusion
Cramer’s transactional interpretation uses the notion of advanced waves in an
effort to make paradoxical quantum-mechanical processes more intelligible. I
have argued that the stochastic character of quantum mechanics and the re-
sulting unpredictability of the future does not introduce inconsistency or loss
of predictive power in Cramer’s theory. The notion of transaction, however,
lies outside the minimal formalism, and is in need of further specification.
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